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A few years ago, Professor Earl Johnson of the University of South-
em California wrote a useful essay on the now fashionable subject of
dispute resolution.1 Extrapolating from the patterns of current practice
and commentary, Johnson sketched four possible scenarios for dispute
resolution in the world of the future. One scenario was a perfected pro-
cess of formal adjudication which involved a proliferation of due process
safeguards for representation, decisions on a record, and review. A sec-
ond scenario was maximum decentralization, a variation on the theme of
neighborhood mediation. His third scenario was "systems analysis" of
whatever problem required solution. Fourth, and last, was a scenario
which Johnson labeled "lowered expectations," meaning what some dis-
pute resolution specialists describe (using a highly unspecialized name)
as "lumping it.' '2
In describing current thinking about the major issues in local land
use regulation, one quite fruitfully can adopt Johnson's method, envi-
sioning the whole field of local land use processes as a series of variations
on a theme of dispute resolution. Since the beginning of modern land use
regulation, courts, legislators, administrative bodies, and academic com-
mentators have struggled to define procedures appropriate for controver-
sies that arise over local governmental control of land use. To a very
considerable degree, their efforts can be grouped and classified as alterna-
tive patterns or models for resolving disputes.
This article will attempt to describe these models for local land use
dispute resolution and will concentrate especially on the newer models
that have appeared in the last few years, either in the courts, in the legis-
latures, or in some law professors' heads. These newer models implicitly
have criticized quite sharply the more traditional views on local land use
procedures and have generated considerable controversy.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B., Antioch College (1962); M.A., University
of Chicago (1963); Ph.D., Cornell University (1969); J.D., University of Chicago (1977).
1 Johnson, The Justice System of the Future: Four Scenarios for the Twenty-First Century, in
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE 183 (M. Cappelletti ed. 1981).
2 Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 63,
81(1974).
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At the outset, it should be noted that local land use controversies
arise in a variety of contexts. Some clearly concern very large projects,
such as the urban renewal clearance projects or the freeway construction
of the last generation.3 These projects entailed large-scale transfers of
property and displacement of neighborhoods, and many of them involved
a great deal of money.
While such large-scale projects were exceedingly disruptive in the
past, the process (as opposed to the substance) of local decisionmaking in
these projects has not generated a high degree of controversy, particu-
larly in recent years. In part, as will be discussed below, this is because
large-scale projects have certain characteristics that tend to assure a rela-
tively open process of local decisionmaking, and that therefore make
them less subject to procedural criticism. In addition, the excessiveness
of the older government-sponsored projects has been scaled down in re-
cent years, particularly in the wake of very sharp criticism of urban re-
newal, 4 although, as will also be discussed below, local governments are
still involved in other kinds of large land development schemes. Finally,
jurisdiction over a number of particularly sensitive projects, especially
those large projects with wide impact, has in some areas been "kicked
upstairs" to state or regional boards. In Florida, for example, state and
regional boards review "developments of regional impact," s and in
Maryland, state authorities control the location of power plants.6
This assertion of state control has been much discussed as a "Quiet
Revolution" in land use regulation.7 Since the present article focuses on
local dealings with land use issues, it will not consider these centralizing
trends further, except to note that the Quiet Revolution, like the scaling
back of urban renewal, has tended to remove a number of large-scale
land projects from the purely local arena.
This is not to say that local governments are altogether out of the
business of dealing with large-scale projects. On the contrary, they con-
tinue to exercise considerable influence even where state boards make the
ultimate decisions over major land development projects.8 Large-scale
3 For a variety of views on such projects, see URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE
CoNTRovERsY (J. Wilson ed. 1966).
4 See, eg., M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER (1964); Gans, The Failure of Urban
Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CoNTRovERSY, supra note 3, at 537.
5 The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 380.012-380.12 (West 1974 & Supp. 1984).
6 Maryland Power Plant Siting Act of 1971, MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 3-301 to -307
(1974).
7 Some leading works on the assertion of state control over land use are R. HEALY & . ROSEN-
BERG, LAND USE AND THE STATES (2d ed. 1979); F. PoPPR, TIlE PoLrICS oF LAND-UsE RE-
FORM (1981); U. S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE
CONTROL (1971), which popularized the name "quiet revolution."
8 See, eg., Callies, The Quiet Revolution Revisited, 46 J. AM. PLAN. A. 135, 136, 139 (1980)
(effect of "revolution" may be to strengthen local grip on land control).
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clearance and redevelopment programs also continue to embroil local
governments from time to time, as in Detroit's decision to displace the
working class "Poletown" neighborhood in order to accommodate Gen-
eral Motors' new factory location,9 or in the recent controversies about
the location and facilities for a now mooted 1992 World's Fair in Chi-
cago, 10 or in New York City's involvement with the much-troubled
"Westway" highway project."
Most local land use disputes, however, are on a much smaller scale
and involve much more prosaic issues. The garden variety land use dis-
pute, the type that fills up state and regional court reporters by the hun-
dreds every year, takes more or less the following classic format: a real
estate developer buys a comer lot in a residential area; he wishes to tear
out the existing Victorian house and install a gas station or an apartment
house, and the horrified neighbors object. The cast of characters thus
includes the developer, the neighbors, and some city board or official in
the middle.
How, then, should the local board or official make up its mind? The
traditional model for the courts' review of local land use decisions was
the legislative model, to which I now turn.
II. LAND USE DECISIONS AS LEGISLATION
Let us take the classic case mentioned above: the corner lot devel-
oper who wants to build a gas station. Let us further suppose that the
property is zoned residential and that, on the developer's request, the city
council amends the zoning ordinance to permit his proposed commercial
use. The courts in reviewing this decision traditionally have character-
ized the council's decision as a legislative act, on the theory that the
council is a legislative body, and its actions must therefore be legislation.
This neat little syllogism implies that the council's rezoning action, as a
"legislative" act, is to be tested by the standard of "reasonableness," a
standard so permissive as to provide very little relief for any aggrieved
parties.12 In the past, this permissive review spilled over even into local
decisions that technically were not undertaken by a city council, such as
the so-called "variances" doled out by zoning boards of review in cases of
9 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
10 See, e'g., World's Fair Study Warns of Problems, Chicago Tribune, May 8, 1984, § 2, at 1, col.
4. For a discussion of the ultimate fate of the World's Fair proposal, see McCarron & Egler, Chi-
cago's 1992 Fair Laid to Rest in 1985, Chicago Tribune, June 21, 1985, at 1, col.2.
11 See, eg., Posner, Waffling on Westway's Architectural Cost, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1984, at 22,
col. 1. For a discussion of the recent demise of Westway, see Roberts, Experts Assert Westway Isn't
Last of Big Projects, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
12 For a critical discussion of this logic, and its extension to referenda and initiatives as "legisla-
tive" acts, see Note, Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa: Rezoning by Initiative and
Landowners'Due Process Rights, 70 CALF. L. REv. 1107, 1116-21 (1982).
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hardship.1 3 These decisions too were treated as the equivalent of legisla-
tion, to be tested only for a minimum rationality, perhaps because the
variance criteria of "undue hardship" and "not contrary to the public
interest" were so loose as to amount to quasi-legislative discretion.
14
This traditional "legislative" model for local land use decisions,
however, has never been a happy choice. Courts always have found it
troubling, particularly in the ordinary small-scale land use dispute in-
volving few interested parties and little publicity. Since at least the 1950s,
judges and commentators occasionally have warned that the legislative
model was inappropriate for review of these decisions; with its deferential
"reasonableness" standard, this model might be leaving the door open
for thoughtless or arbitrary local decisionmaking.15 And, of course, the
backdrop to this fear was the impression that local land use decisions
were all too susceptible to undue influence or outright corruption.16
If one thinks of a congressional act as the paradigm "legislative" act,
it is easy to see why a local land use decision might seem problematic as
"legislation." Congress is a large body, representing exceedingly varied
interests and covering a high volume of business. Madison's Federalist
No. 10 suggests that all these interests should achieve at least partial
satisfaction through the shifting process of congressional coalition-build-
ing and logrolling for votes. Because this "logrolling" process acts as an
independent guarantor of fairness, courts that review congressional legis-
lation can presume that Congress has acted reasonably towards all inter-
ested parties.17 Moreover, precisely because of the wide variety of
interest groups with something at stake in national legislation, congres-
sional acts attract a relatively high level of publicity and public scrutiny,
again lessening the need for scrupulous judicial attention, at least under
normal circumstances.1 8 Thus, it is this wide participation and publicity
that entitles Congress' legislation to the loose judicial review entailed in a
"reasonableness" standard.
In some instances, local land use decisions may share the traits that
justify a "reasonableness" standard of review, even though in many other
13 See 3 R. ANDERSON, AMmCAN LAW OF ZONING § 20.01 (1977) (permissive standards of
review applied to variances and conditional use permits).
14 Indeed, in the 1930s courts in Illinois and Maryland overturned the variance process as an
improper delegation of "legislative" powers. Welton v. Hamilton, 344 11. 82, 176 N.E. 333 (1931);
Sugar v. North Baltimore Methodist Protestant Church, 164 Md. 487, 165 A. 703 (1933).
15 See, e-g., Ward v. Village of Skokie, 26 I1. 2d 415, 419-24, 186 N.E.2d 529, 531-32 (1962)
(Klingbiel, J., concurring); R. BABcocK, THE ZONING GAME 158 (1966).
16 R. BABCOCK, supra note 15, at 104.
17 See generally Waggoner, Log-rolling and Judicial Review, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 33 (1980); cf.
Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1596 (1965) (distinguishing dominant,
stable majorities in small city governments from shifting coalitions in Congress; minorities less pro-
tected in former).
18 For non-normal circumstances in which Madisonian pluralism fails to protect isolated minori-
ties, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dismusr 80-88 (1980).
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instances they may not. Large-scale local land decisions-urban renewal
programs, economic development projects, or major infrastructure devel-
opments-are highly publicized and involve many different interest-
groups; they often are debated for long periods and may become focal
points for elections. Local councils' decisions on these projects, like con-
gresional acts, are legitimated by the surrounding publicity, public scru-
tiny, and opportunity for wide public participation.
This point is reflected in case law, where courts generally defer to
local decisions on large projects. For example, local governments often
assist such projects by using their eminent domain powers to assemble
land. Eminent domain is supposed to be employed only for a "public
use," and the courts' broad interpretation of the "public use" test reflects
a view of these decisions as "legislative"-that is, subject only to minimal
judicial scrutiny.
This was not always the case. Fifty years ago, at least some courts
regarded the "public use" requirement as meaning "use by the public,"
substantially limiting eminent domain to projects such as official build-
ings or roads that were open to all. 19 But since the urban renewal
projects of the 1950s, courts have interpreted "public use" much more
liberally and now permit eminent domain for any purpose that may pro-
vide a vague "public benefit," such as downtown revitalization or eco-
nomic growth.20 Even when Detroit condemned the "Poletown"
neighborhood to facilitate General Motors' factory expansion, and a pri-
vate commercial enterprise became the ultimate owner of the condemned
property, Michigan's Supreme Court declined to second-guess the local
government's finding of a public use for the condemnation.
2'
These expansive interpretations of the "public use" requirement are
one version of the loose "reasonableness" standard for legislation. And
again, such interpretations may indeed make sense for large projects.
Whether a city is wise or unwise in deciding to condemn property for a
large-scale project, the decision is certainly likely to have elicited public-
ity and participation from a wide range of interests, and thus it shares the
qualities that tend to justify deferential judicial review of legislation.
It is much harder to make the "legislative" case, however, for the
vastly more numerous small-scale local disputes over the proposed new
gas station or apartment building on the corner lot. The decision to per-
mit or deny the gas station is not a general piece of legislation affecting
many different interests; it is only a decision about a particular piece of
property in a particular neighborhood. The parties have no opportunity
19 See, e.g., Arnsperger v. Crawford, 101 Md. 247, 61 A. 413 (1905).
20 The leading case is Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). For the U.S. Supreme Court's
reaffirmation of a loose standard of judicial review of a legislature's finding of "public use" (albeit
here a state rather than a local legislature), see Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S 229
(1984).
21 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
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to trade off their various goals through the logrolling process because
they are interested only in the single issue of what happens to this or that
piece of land. The problem with these decisions is precisely that they do
not boil over into major controversies, they do not involve many people,
they do not interest the press: it is precisely their small scale and uncon-
troversial character that may open the door to arbitrariness or inside
deals. But when a court measures these decisions by the criterion of leg-
islative "reasonableness," there are almost no grounds for reversal, no
matter how arbitrary or unfair the particular decision may seem.
Some courts, notably in Illinois, have addressed this problem in ef-
fect by ignoring the usual deference to "legislative" decisions and by ap-
plying their own views of what is and what is not a "reasonable" land use
decision.22 This solution, to be sure, involves a considerable willingness
to second-guess elected officials, something that many courts are reluc-
tant to do.23 Some other courts, less willing to substitute their own judg-
ment for that of a city council, have borrowed the expertise of the local
planning commissions and have tended to scrutinize especially carefully
those local land use decisions that run counter to the advice of the profes-
sional planners.
24
These are more or less informal ways courts contend with the seem-
ing unsuitability of the "legislative" designation to the majority of local
land use cases. In recent years, however, courts in several states have
turned to a solution that has considerably more elaborate theoretical
trappings than mere informal tinkering with the "reasonableness" stan-
dard: they have abandoned the "legislative" model in favor of an "adju-
dicative" model.
III. LAND USE DECIsIoNs AS ADJUDICATION
In the last ten or fifteen years, courts in several states-beginning
with Kentucky25 and Oregon 26 and followed to a degree by California27
and Colorado,28 among others29-have introduced a different model for
small-scale land disputes. Instead of designating these decisions as legis-
22 R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, LAND-UE CoNTROis 75 (1981).
23 Illinois judges are elected, which may make them more willing to take a critical look at the
decisions of other elected officials.
24 See Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 215-17, 164 A.2d 7, 11-12 (1960); see also
Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development. A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of Land
Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 73-77 (1965).
25 City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971).
26 Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
27 Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d
12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974); cf. Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d
565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980) (reiterating the California rule that zoning ordinances are legislative,
while variances and subdivision map approvals are adjudicative).
28 Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975) (city council zoning decision
is reviewed as "quasi-judicial" decision); cf. Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981)
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lation, these courts have begun to use adjudication as their model for
review.
30
Administrative law ideas have motivated this shift of models. Ad-
ministrative law doctrine commonly distinguishes between an agency de-
cision that adopts general standards and one that applies previously
adopted general standards to a given set of facts. The former, "rulemak-
ing" type of decision is analogous to legislation; the latter type of deci-
sion is analogous to adjudication because, in applying rules to specific
instances, the agency is really functioning in the way that a court does.31
Similarly, when a local council decides a land use matter involving only a
single parcel or small area, it is really acting more like a court than like a
legislature, because it is not deliberating on general standards, but is
making a single decision in a specific case. And because this is the type
of decision a court makes, it is argued that the council should model its
procedures on those of a court.
32
For the reviewing court, this model entails a change in the questions
to ask about the legitimacy of a local council's decision to grant or deny
the developer a permit to construct the corner gas station. Instead of a
vague query as to the "reasonableness" of the decision, the reviewing
court can direct its questions to the correctness of the council's "adjudi-
cative" processes. Did the council have standards (particularly those of
the city's general plan) when it made the decision to permit the gas sta-
tion? Was it actually applying those standards? Did it provide notice
and an appropriate hearing to interested parties? Could witnesses be
cross-examined? Did the council keep an adequate record of the pro-
ceedings and make findings and a decision on the record? Were the deci-
sionmakers impartial? In short, the reviewing court can ask whether the
decision met the model for a proper adjudication-even though the deci-
sionmaking body is a group of elected politicians. 33
The adjudicative model for land use decisions, particularly those in-
volving small-scale projects, has attracted a considerable amount of aca-
demic attention and has been adopted at least in part in the American
(zoning decision is "legislative" for purposes of referendum and initiative provisions of Colorado
Constitution).
29 Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972); Golden v. City of Over-
land Park, 224 Kan. 591, 584 P.2d 130 (1978).
30 The leading case is generally acknowledged to be Fasano. See Rose, Planning and Dealing:
Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALF. L. REV. 837, 844-46 (1983),
and authorities cited therein.
31 See, ag., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1964); 1 K. DAVIS, ADmNSTATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 7.02 (1958).
32 Fasano, 264 Or. at 579-85, 507 P.2d at 26-27.
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Law Institute's Model Land Development Code.34 The model seems to
rationalize the ad hoe character of the garden variety one-lot rezoning or
variance; it gives the reviewing courts some genuine inquiries to make,
and it satisfies possible due process objections to the designation of small-
scale decisions as "legislation."
But with all these features to recommend the adjudicative model, it
is a bit startling to find that the reaction of a number of jurisdictions has
been somewhat cool. Michigan, for example, flirted with the model but
then retreated;35 California and Colorado, while adopting the model for
certain types of small land control decisions, have rejected it for others,
36
and other jurisdictions have simply not bothered with the model at all. 37
This reaction suggests that there are some problems with the adjudicative
model, despite its glamor in land use academic circles.
One problem with the adjudicative model concerns the standards
that are to be "adjudicatively" applied. The courts' usual answer is that
the standards should be those of the municipality's own general plan.
38
But these documents are notoriously vague. The plan may simply be a
cardboard box full of uncoordinated memos and reports, 39 or, if more
coherent, the plan may be full of large, loose platitudes about "high levels
of community development" and maps consisting of uncertain blobs of
color-all of which are designed to leave maximum flexibility with the
local board deciding the individual case.4° Even plans for historic dis-
tricts, which tend to be relatively specific as plans go, frequently require
only that new structures be "in harmony with" or not "obviously incon-
gruous" with the old.
4 1
If plans are vague, however, they provide no genuine standards for
individual decisions. And if that is so, then it is very difficult to charac-
34 For commentary, see authorities cited in Rose, supra note 30, at 844 n.17; MODEL LAND
DEv. CODE §§ 2-201(3), 2-304 & note, 2-312(2), (3), 3-101 & note (1976).
35 Cunningham, Reflections on Stare Decisis in Michigan: The Rise and Fall of the "Rezoning as
Administrative Act" Doctrine, 75 MacH. L. REv. 983 (1977).
36 See authorities cited supra notes 27-28; see also Rose, supra note 30, at 845 n.18.
37 See, e.g., Hall Paving Co. v. Hall County, 237 Ga. 14, 226 S.E.2d 728 (1976) (per curiam).
38 Fasano, 264 Or. at 582-83, 507 P.2d at 27.
39 Camp v. Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors, 123 Cal. App. 3d 334, 349 n.8, 176 Cal. Rptr.
620, 630 n.8 (1981).
40 See, eg., Sierra Club v. County of Alameda, 73 Cal. App. 3d 572, 140 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1977)
(zoning changes to be based on "general welfare").
41 See, e.g., the much emulated Nantucket historic district legislation, ch. 601, 1955 Mass. Acts
494 (current version at ch. 395, 1970 Mass. Acts 237). The Nantucket ordinance requires the historic
district commission to "keep in mind" such matters as "general design," materials, colors, etc. Some
historic districts spell out the elements that are to "harmonize" in greater detail, as in Savannah,
where new structures get points based on "relatedness" to design features of older structures, such as
roof pitch, color, materials, placement of windows and doors, etc. See Tondro, An Historic Preserva-
tion Approach to Municipal Rehabilitation of Older Neighborhoods, 8 CoNN. L. REv. 248, 267-74
(1976).
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terize the individual decision as an "adjudicative" act that applies preex-
isting standards to a specific instance.
It may be, too, that local governments have a good reason for keep-
ing their land use plans rather fuzzy: they may not want a fixed plan
because they cannot realistically see very far into the future. Neither can
anyone else. Consider, for a moment, how dramatically our attitudes
have changed in the last few decades about the appropriate placement of
various land uses. In the past it was common to place tanneries and glue
factories in a separate "industrial" zone, but the new high-tech plants,
though they may be "industries," require no such separation. The local
"home for the feeble-minded" was also once placed in zones with heavy
industry and other undesirable uses.42 But this is entirely contrary to
modem theories of community placement for mental health patients and
retarded persons; these newer theories would place the homes in residen-
tial areas and would require some flexibility in the once-sacroscant single
family zone.43 More generally, we have a far greater appreciation of
mixed uses in single areas than was once the case and a vastly greater
appreciation for historic structures.44 Indeed, whole constituencies
spring up to preserve old structures and neighborhoods that were deemed
eyesores and "blight" twenty years ago.45
In view of the way we all change our opinions of what is and is not
desirable in land use, it is no wonder that local governments shy away
from general plans that genuinely will structure their day-to-day deci-
sions. But this in turn means that the "adjudicative" model of land use
decisions becomes exceedingly problematic: if there are no fixed stan-
dards, no law to apply, then local boards are not really acting as adjudi-
cative bodies.
In addition to the problem of standards, the adjudicative model for
42 The ordinance upheld in the classic zoning case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926), placed "insane and feeble minded institutions" in the lowest use zone along with
prisons, crematories, garbage and refuse incineration, scrap iron and junk storage, petroleum works,
and any other manufacturing or industrial uses.
43 See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (city
ordinance excluding mentally retarded group home without rational justification is violation of equal
protection clause); Region 10 Client Management, Inc., v. Town of Hampstead, 120 N.H. 885, 424
A.2d 207 (1980) (town zoning ordinance for single family dwellings subordinate to state policy for
placing retarded persons in communities).
44 One of the first major authors to direct attention to the value of mixed uses was Jane Jacobs. J.
JAcoBS, THE DEATH AND L*FE oF GREAT AMERICAN CmIEs 152 (1961). In recent years, develop-
ers such as James Rouse have capitalized on the current appreciation for mixed uses as well as
historic rehabilitation. See He Digs Downtown, Tnas, Aug. 24, 1981, at 42. On the current interest
in historic preservation, see Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of His-
toric Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REv. 473 (1981).
45 Some of these constituencies are represented in the quite colorful names of historic preserva-
tion litigation. E-g., Don't Tear It Down v. Washington, 399 F. Supp. 153 (D.D.C. 1975); Save Our
Sycamore v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 414 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Ga. 1976), affld 576
F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1978); Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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land use decisions has encountered a number of procedural snares and
has not succeeded in clarifying the processes that local governments ac-
tually should use in land use decisions. One major problem has been ex
parte contacts. Local council members talk to their constituents-indeed
they are expected to do so-about land use matters as well as other gov-
ernmental issues. Does this mean that they cannot make an adjudicative
decision on an issue that they have discussed with constituents "out of
court"? They may also campaign on the very issues that they have to
decide. But if a council member has run on a pro-development or anti-
development position, or takes such a position on general principles, does
this mean that the council member cannot make an impartial decision?
The courts tend to say that none of this matters,46 but it is hard to see
why not, if the process is supposed to emulate a courtroom proceeding
with disinterested judges.
As for that "adjudicative" proceeding itself, do witnesses have to be
sworn? Should they be open to cross-examination? What are the stan-
dards of relevance? The Kentucky courts have had these matters before
them and, sensibly recognizing that land use hearings tend to be a bit of
an emotional free-for-all, have decided that these formal trappings of
courtroom process are unnecessary.47 But what happens then to the ad-
judicative model for land use decisions? It seems to fall apart, or at least
fails to generate clear criteria about which court-like processes are re-
quired and which are not.
Thus the adjudicative model is hardly a trouble-free paradigm for
local land use decisions. This model is in large part a creation of the
courts, and the courts may be expected to spell out the model's ramifica-
tions and attempt to deal with its shortcomings in the future. But not all
the new models come from the courts. Another new model for land use
decisions is the special darling of legal academics, though local govern-
ments also seem especially interested in its practical applications. This is
the market model, to which the next section is addressed.
IV. LAND USE DECISIONS AS MARKET TRANSACTIONS
The market model for local land use decisions would be unthinkable
without the law and economics scholarship of the last generation. Un-
derlying this model is the idea that land use decisions can be made more
efficient if they are analogized to private market transactions in which
resources travel to their most valued uses through a series of trades.
The market model for land use decisions tells us that we can forget
46 See, e.g., City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, 537 P.2d 375, 122 Cal. Rptr. 543
(1975); Turf Valley Assoc. v. Zoning Bd., 262 Md. 632, 278 A.2d 574 (1971); Neuberger v. City of
Portland, 288 Or. 585, 607 P.2d 722 (1980).
47 See, e.g., Fiscal Court v. Ogden, 556 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Bellemeade Co. v.
Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
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about plans and substantive standards and complex adjudicative
processes for land use decisions because we do not really need them. A
local legislature can figure out what to do by looking to the willingness of
interested parties to pay for what they want. If the neighbors want to
keep the Victorian mansion from being razed and replaced with a gas
station, they can do so, and the city need not issue the demolition permit;
the neighbors or the city, however, will have to pay the owner to keep the
structure as it is.48
Under this economic analysis, it would seem clear that if the neigh-
bors and the city try to get something for nothing, they are bound to fail;
their schemes may even backfire. Economic analysts indeed could point
to historic preservation for a dramatic example of the point: there is a
strikingly high incidence of arson among buildings designated as pro-
tected landmarks.49 The answer, according to economic thinking, is not
to regulate without paying, but to compensate owners sufficiently, so that
they will not be tempted to thwart the community's goals in such a dev-
astating manner.50
This kind of economic thinking has had a substantial impact on lo-
cal land use practice in the last few years. Localities have been develop-
ing all kinds of schemes to "pay" for what they want, or for what they
think their citizens want. One valuable asset that localities have traded is
zoning relief. A form of zoning relief somewhat in vogue is the transfer
of development rights (TDRs): an owner may be prohibited from replac-
ing his one-story historic landmark with an office highrise, but the city
will "compensate" him by allowing him to transfer his unused airspace
to another building. This scheme is perhaps best known in the area of
historic preservation but has been used in a number of other areas as
well.51 For instance, San Francisco has used air rights bonuses for all
kinds of desired "amenities," so that the developer who provides a nice
park, with benches, shrubs, a fountain and sunlight, can build higher on
the building's location or elsewhere. He might get a bonus if he voluntar-
ily builds residential housing into his office structure, or he might be re-
quired to do so, but be compensated for his effort with the right to build
48 For an argument for compensation, see Comment, Allocating the Cost of Historic Preservation:
Compensation for the Isolated Landmark Owner, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 646 (1979).
49 Walters, Arson, A Heritage in Names, 33 Hisr. PRESERVATION, Mar./Apr. 1981, at 10.
50 Comment, supra note 48, at 648; Hershman, Critical Legal Issues in Historic Preservation, 12
URB. LAW. 19, 28 (1980) (uncompensated regulation may discourage investment in historic
properties).
51 Probably the best known scholar on development rights transfer is John Costonis. See, ag.,
Costonis, Fair Compensation and the Accommodation Power. Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in
Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1021 (1975); Costonis, The Chicago Plan Incentive
Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARv. L. Rv. 574 (1972). For uses of TDR
schemes in, for example, the protection of New Jersey's Pineland areas, see Randle, The National
Reserve System and Transferable Development Rights. Is the New Jersey Pinelands Plan an Unconsti-
tutional "Taking"?, 10 B.C. ENVTL. A . L. REv. 183 (1983).
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additional "bonus" floors. 52
These transfer and bonus schemes bear a striking resemblance to the
"bubble" concept in environmental law. According to this concept, the
air above an entire plant is considered a "bubble" of pollution, and an
owner of a polluting plant need not control every separate source of pol-
lution so long as a highly polluting source is offset by a low pollution rate
at another.53 Transfer schemes treat a city (or portion thereof) as a "den-
sity bubble" and allow transfers of density so long as the city's overall
density or "carrying capacity" is not exceeded.
As in bubble schemes, there are certain technical problems with
transfer and bonus schemes in land use, the most dramatic concerning
the locations to which unused or bonus air rights may be transferred.
For a time, New York City permitted TDRs only to nearby lots, with the
effect that low-lying historic landmarks or "bonusable" parks acquired
enormous highrises as neighbors, creating a "Mutt and Jeff" look.
54
Even more problematic are height and bulk bonuses for seemingly unre-
lated "amenities" such as subway entrances or artwork. As with the
"bubble" concept, the major difficulty here is to know what offsets what:
is density the same commodity in different places? Is a fountain or a
piece of artwork an offset for a building's greater height or bulk?
Quite aside from these technical problems, the market model raises
another difficulty: assuming that desired land uses should be paid for,
either with dollars or with in-kind bonuses, how much should be paid?
The neighbors may very well be able to figure out how much it is worth
to them to keep out the gas station. But how are we to deal with land use
cases in which the development affects a wider public? Take the destruc-
tion of an old theater or the construction of a building that disrupts a
vista of the mountains: how much is the older structure or the view
worth to the neighbors, or to the larger public? What is the appropriate
mode and amount of payment?55
Similar problems affect all the so-called incentive schemes that are
so popular now. Whether one is thinking of a transfer of development
rights for an urban park or of regulatory relief in an "enterprise zone" to
keep businesses in depressed areas, one has the same questions. How
much is it worth, and who is interested? Is it really worth the tax losses
52 See Rose, supra note 30, at 905 and authorities cited therein.
53 See, e-g., Yao, Plain Dust is the Key to Pollution "Bubble" at Armco Steelworks, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 11, 1980, at 1, col. 6. For the Supreme Court's recent approval of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's "bubble" regulations, see Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104
S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
54 See Dept. of City Planning, City of New York, Midtown Development Project, Draft Report
50 (June, 1980). For a different criticism of bonus zoning schemes, primarily focusing on distribu-
tional effects, see Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1167 (1981),
and F. JAMES & D. GALE, ZONING FOR SALE (1977).
55 For a discussion of pricing problems of such "environmental" goods, see generally Sagoff,
Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MicH. L. REv. 1393, 1402-10 (1981).
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or visual blight to attract commercial development? Is it worth the
overbulk in some places to create open spaces elsewhere?56 In short,
while a market model may tell us that something has to be paid for de-
sired uses, it does not tell us how much, especially when the costs and
benefits revolve around those amorphous and wide-ranging items that we
call "environmental."
Moreover, a market model doesn't tell us who has to pay whom in
any given instance. In the classic gas station case, is the gas station a
nuisance-like use, so that the developer has to pay the neighbors if he
wants to build? Or does the developer have the right to tear down the
Victorian mansion and build the station, so that the neighbors have to
buy him out if they want to preserve the status quo? According to some
of the law and economics scholars most interested in market models, an
efficient solution may not depend on the underlying distribution of prop-
erty rights (at least where trading is easy).57 But insofar as a market
model is indifferent to the underlying property rights, it doesn't tell us
who should pay whom or, to put it another way, which local land use
decisions are compensable events and which are merely regulatory.
To their credit, however, market model advocates have stimulated
further thought about the ways to define the underlying property rights.
Robert Ellickson, one of the leading proponents of market solutions for
land use problems, has tried to come to grips with the problem of defin-
ing the underlying property entitlements and has suggested that such
rights can be determined by ordinary language or ordinary practice. He
has suggested, for example, a whole apparatus of "nuisance boards" to
decide whether a proposed use is considered a "nuisance" by the stan-
dards of the community (if so, the proposed use will have to pay off the
neighbors; if not, the neighbors will have to pay to keep out the use).5 8
While we may not need the elaborate administrative apparatus that El-
lickson suggests, his proposed standard of ordinary practice or usage is a
very enlightening one.
Market models, then, are not entirely self-executing. A market
model does not say how much to pay or what the appropriate mode of
payment might be; it does not say even who should pay whom. But by
56 For a discussion of "enterprise zones," and a comparison to other incentive schemes such as
tax abatement and bonus zoning, see Note, Enterprise Zones." New Life for the Inner City, 4 HARv. I.
L. & Pun. POL'Y 243, 258-59 (1981).
57 Coase, of course, provided the classic analysis in The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECoN.
1, 2-8 (1960) over which an extraordinary amount of academic ink has been spilled. For two recent
critiques, see Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 14-24 (1982) (bargaining strategy
may prevent efficient transactions); Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology
in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669, 689-91 (1979) (income effects may influence ultimate
allocation of resources).
58 Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules; and Knes as Land Use Controls,
40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 762-72 (1973); for a discussion of community standards on the meaning of
nuisance or harm, see id. at 728-33.
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its very indifference to these issues, a market model brings them into
focus and encourages the rest of us to think about them. What do we
want in land uses, and how much? What is a fair trade for what we
want? How do we define the underlying property rights that tell us who
should pay whom for what?
A market model, then, highlights some important facets of land use
practice; it gets people to ask questions about what they really want, and
how badly, and about the proper distribution of rights and responsibili-
ties in using property. A final "negotiation" model for land use decisions
attempts to identify a process for answering some of those questions.
V. LAND USE DECISIONS AS NEGOTIATIONS
Like the market model for land use decisions, this fourth and final
model has two major sources, one academic and one practical. It stems
in part from the legal academic discussion of "alternative dispute resolu-
tion," a discussion that rejects (at least for some matters) the formal style
of adjudication. The other major source of the negotiation model is the
set of practices loosely associated with environmental review.
In searching for alternatives to adjudication-partly because it is too
expensive and partly because it does not always seem to lead to stable or
lasting conflict resolution-academics from the "alternative dispute reso-
lution" school have turned to the social sciences and particularly to an-
thropology. 59 Anthropologists have often mentioned negotiation and
mediation as processes for resolving conflicts, and have discussed the
conditions that are most likely to bring about a conclusion satisfactory to
the parties involved.6° Generally speaking, their work suggests that the
decision making process should be opened up rather than narrowed; that
the process should be fairly loose about such matters as who can talk,
what sorts of issues they can raise, and what sorts of solutions they can
suggest; and that it should include a whole range of possible tradeoffs
instead of a flat "yes or no" decision. The idea here is to come to a
resolution that satisfies or at least mollifies everyone, and not to arrive at
the win-or-lose solutions typical of judicial decisions. The goal is to as-
sure the interested parties' future ability to get along, and not their pres-
ent victory or defeat.
In land use, and particularly in those dizzying numbers of small-
scale land use conflicts over gas stations and apartment buildings and the
like, one can fairly easily envision the local governmental board's role as
that of a mediator in a negotiated dispute resolution. Under this model,
59 See, ag., Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal
Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Felstiner, supra note 2. A more recent anthology is THE POLI-
TicS op INFoRMAL JUSTICE (R. Abel ed. 1982).
60 For a discussion of this literature, see THE DispuTNG PROCESS-LAW IN TEN SOcIETIES 1-
40 (L. Nader & H. Todd eds. 1978). For perhaps the most extensive treatment, see P. GuLIVYER,
Dispurms AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1979).
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we could stop pretending that local boards are applying general, neutral,
pre-existing standards to individual decisions and instead see them as at-
tempting (though not always successfully) to intermediate a "deal" be-
tween the neighbors and the developer.
61
One land-use related area in which the mediation model can already
be seen is environmental law, where some commentators explicitly have
proposed mediation as a model for resolving environmental disputes.62
But even when mediation is not explicit, environmental review often has
a mediative flavor, particularly on the local level. In some states, envi-
ronmental review statutes have been interpreted to require local govern-
ments to go through an environmental impact review of their land use
decisions,63 and this review has some distinctly mediative characteristics.
The statutes' review processes require the local board to collect the views
of more or less anyone who is interested in, say, an historic structure or
ocean vista, and then to explore why and to whom the structure or vista
might be valuable before issuing (with explanation) a demolition or con-
struction permit. As in mediation, the review opens up the decision pro-
cess. Moreover, by way of mollifying parties and seeking acceptable
solutions, the board not only must explain why it grants or denies a per-
mit, but also must attempt to "mitigate" damage. Thus, the parties
might be reconciled to the destruction of an old building so long as the
developer "mitigates" the damage by retaining the old facade in the new
structure.
This is not so different from what local land use boards have always
done in "variance" or "rezoning" decisions, at least when they have done
their job adequately: they notify interested parties, they hear all kinds of
information (and this includes allowing the parties to let off steam), and
they try to explain their decisions and arrive at tradeoffs that will satisfy
everyone-approving the gas station, for example, on condition that it be
surrounded by shrubs.64 The issue under this model is the adequacy of
the mediating process: did the local board really do all it reasonably
could to mediate a successful negotiated solution between the interested
61 For this author's efforts to describe land use decisions as mediations, see Rose, supra note 30,
at 887-93.
62 See, eg., Susskind & Weinstein, Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 9
B.C. ENvrL. AFs. L. REv. 311 (1980-81). But cf. Schoenbrod, Limits and Dangers of Environmen-
tal Mediation, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1453 (1983).
63 A major case is Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049,
104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). See also Cook v. Clallam County, 27 Wash. App. 410, 618 P.2d 1030
(1980); Pearlman, State Environmental Policy Acts: Local Decision Making and Land Use Planning,
43 1 INsr. AM. PLANNERs 42 (1977).
64 An example of this free-form process, involving "emotional responses to technical issues,"
appears in Fiscal Court v. Ogden, 556 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). For a discussion of the
"venting" or "catharsis" function of local land use hearings, see Goldton & Scheuer, Zoning of
Planned Residential Developments, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 241, 255 (1959); see also C. PESuN, EvERY-
T-mNG IN rrs PLACE 183-84 (1977). For a discussion of the mediative aspects of older land use
practice, particularly the variance procedure, see Rose, supra note 30, at 860.
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parties? The literature from the "alternative dispute resolution" scholars
suggests that the proper questions are whether a local board gave wide
notice, allowed a free-ranging hearing, considered alternatives and trade-
offs, and explained its ultimate decisions according to community norms.
The negotiation or mediation model of land use decisions has some
problems too, as do all the other models. First, in a field that seems so
rife with "deals" as land use, one might well resist a model that seems to
accept dealmaking as the basic format. The answer, of course, is that we
are very likely to have local land use deals anyway, and we might as well
make this explicit and perhaps refine the process. The negotiation model
does at least stress that there are conditions for successful deals and that
those conditions require openness, flexibility, and a certain appeal to the
moral sensibilities of the community and the interested parties.
A second problem with the negotiation model is its mushiness on
property rights. The owner of the corner lot may think that he damned
well has a right to tear down the Victorian house and build the gas sta-
tion, while the neighbors insist that he has no such right at all and that
his proposed acts are a violation of their property rights. Can any settle-
ment be negotiated or mediated so long as this issue of underlying rights
goes unresolved? Or is the negotiation model, like the market model,
simply silent about the underlying property rights of interested parties,
taking those as a given without really helping to define them?
At least some market model proponents do suggest ordinary prac-
tice or ordinary language as a way to define property rights. 65 The medi-
ation or negotiation model suggests a way to figure out what this
ordinary practice or ordinary usage is: the standards of the community
emerge from what we might call "jawboning"; that is, standards are de-
fined in a discourse of the community about things that matter to its
members. 66 The mediation model should supply a forum for discovering
what the interested community thinks and what the ordinary practices
are. Beyond that, the model should define some conditions that will
make the forum work properly.
VI. CONCLUSION
The new models for land use decisions-adjudicative, market, and
mediative-emerged because courts and commentators were dissatisfied
with the legislative model as a means of resolving the most common form
of local land decision, one involving a small area and a few interested
parties. No one seriously quarrels with the "legislative" designation of
major decisions concerning controversial, large-scale projects, even when
65 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
66 R. RORTY, Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM
165-66, 168 (1982).
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such decisions are made by local boards.67 But the one-lot decisions are
simply a different kind of beast. They bring out all the chumminess, in-
formality, and dealmaking qualities of local government. Local govern-
ment need not be bad government, but, as small-scale land decisions
show, local government simply does not operate the way a big legislature
does. Local government requires its own models for small-scale land use
decisions. The new models for local land use, more than anything else,
represent an effort to come to grips not only with land use but also with
local decisionmaking generally. They are cause for cheer in that they
illustrate how other lines of thought-administrative law, economics, al-
ternative dispute resolution---can enrich the way we think about local
government and local decisionmaking processes.
67 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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